Decision-making is usually accompanied by metacognition, through which a decision maker 14 monitors the decision uncertainty and consequently revises the decision, even prior to feedback. 15 However, the neural mechanisms of metacognition remain controversial: one theory proposes 16 that metacognition coincides the decision-making process; and another addresses that it entails 17 an independent neural system in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Here we devised a novel paradigm 18 of "decision-redecision" to investigate the metacognition process in redecision, in comparison 19 with the decision process. We here found that the anterior PFC, including dorsal anterior 20 cingulate cortex (dACC) and lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), were exclusively activated after 21 the initial decisions. dACC was involved in decision uncertainty monitoring, whereas lFPC was 22 involved in decision adjustment controlling, subject to control demands of the tasks. Our 23 findings support that the PFC is essentially involved in metacognition and further suggest that 24 functions of the PFC in metacognition are dissociable. 25 26 Keywords 27 Metacognition; Decision-making; Uncertainty; Cognitive control; Dorsal anterior cingulate 28 cortex; Frontopolar cortex; Prefrontal cortex; fMRI. 29 30 65 decision-making process, and exclusively relies on accumulated evidence (Vickers 1979; Kiani 66 and Shadlen, 2009; Resulaj et al., 2009; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Kiani et al., 2014; Yu et 67 al., 2015; van den Berg et al., 2016). Specifically, this theory on the basis of bounded 68 accumulation models interpreted that the divergence between decision accuracy and confidence 69 reports might be caused by continuous post-decisional evidence accumulation during the 70 intervals between decisions and confidence reports (Resulaj et al., 2009; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 71 2010; Yu et al., 2015; van den Berg et al., 2016). Further, decision adjustment could naturally 72 occur by continuous post-decisional evidence accumulation (Resulaj et al., 2009; van den Berg et 73 al., 2016). Therefore, it argues that a separate neural system for metacognition to monitor and 74 control the decision-making process should be not necessary (van den Berg et al., 2016). 75 76 3
Introduction 31 32
Decision-making is a process of evidence accumulation. The evidence comes from sensory 33 signals of external stimuli or mental representations of internal cognitive operation. Variations of 34 evidence may render a decision uncertain. A decision maker is often intentionally or 35 automatically aware of such an uncertain state of the decision, and confirms or revises the initial 36 decision, even prior to feedback. For instance, before submitting the manuscript, the authors 37 have revised it several times, as being aware of uncertainty, although the review outcome is 38 unknown. In literature, the processes of decision uncertainty monitoring and consequent decision 39 adjustment are termed as metacognition, that is, "cognition about cognition" (Flavell, 1979; 40 Nelson and Narens, 1990; Dunlosky and Metcalfe, 2009; Fleming and Dolan 2012). Although On the contrary, it has been addressed that metacognition could be merely dependent on the
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Task paradigm 123 124 We developed a novel experimental paradigm -"decision-redecision" (Figure 1A ). The 125 participant was instructed to make an initial decision (decision phase), immediately followed by 126 another decision on the same situation (redecision phase), so that the participant could utilize this 127 opportunity to revise the initial decision and update the confidence rating. The internal states of 128 uncertainty on the initial and final decisions were separately evaluated by confidence rating 129 (four-level scales; confidence phase), immediately after the decisions. The uncertainty level was 130 then negative to the confidence rating (i.e., 4 -the confidence level). Different from the previous We used two different types of decision-making tasks in the present study; one was a rule- 136 based decision-making (Sudoku) task, and the other was a perceptual decision-making (random 137 dot motion, RDM) task, which had been intensively used to investigate the neural process of 140 and metacognition processes of the former task might rely on internal information operation, but 141 those of the latter might be merely dependent on accumulation of external new information. We 142 compared the behavioral and the neural differences between the decision-making and 143 metacognition processes, as well as their differences between the two tasks. The sequences of 144 both tasks were identical ( Figure 1A , illustrated for the main fMRI experiment, fMRI1). After a 145 Sudoku problem or RDM stimulus was presented for 2 s, the participant made a choice from four 146 options and then reported the confidence rating each in 2 s. Critically, the same Sudoku problem 147 or RDM stimulus was immediately repeated for 4 s, and the participant made a choice and 148 reported the confidence rating again each in 2 s. As the control condition, a digital number was 149 illustrated in the target grid in the Sudoku task, and a RDM stimulus with 100% coherence was 150 used in the RDM task. For the former, the participant only needed to press the button matching 151 the number, and for the latter, the participant indicated the unambiguous RDM direction. For 152 both tasks, the task difficulty ( Figure 1B ) of each trial was adaptively adjusted by a staircase 153 procedure (Levitt, 1971; Fleming et al., 2010) , so that the average accuracy for the first decision 154 was converged to approximately 50% (the chance level was 25%). Prior to the experiments, each 155 participant was trained to attain a high-level proficiency in the Sudoku problem solving. 156 157 Behavioral results 158 159 Twenty-one participants took part in fMRI1 (See Materials and Methods). In both tasks, the 160 uncertainty levels were largely consistent with the error likelihoods of the initial decisions 161 ( Figure 1C ; r = 0.76 ± 0.12, mean ± standard deviation, one tailed t test, t 21 = 7.3, P = 1.7 × 10 -7 162 in the Sudoku task; r = 0.71 ± 0.14, t 21 = 6.8, P = 5.0 × 10 -7 in the RDM task). To examine the Figure 1D ; one tailed paired-t test, t 21 = 6.6, P = 7.3 × 10 -7 in the Sudoku task; t 21 = 7.8, P = 5.6 172 × 10 -8 in the RDM task). The response time (RT) of option choices in the initial decision was 173 strongly and positively correlated with the uncertainty level ( Figure 1E ; one tailed t test, t 21 = 174 6.9, P = 4.0 × 10 -7 in the Sudoku task; t 21 = 4.3, P = 1.6 × 10 -4 in the RDM task), but was weakly 175 correlated with the task difficulty (one tailed t test, t 21 = 2.1, P = 0.048 in the Sudoku task; t 21 = 176 2.0, P = 0.052 in the RDM task), due to the control of task difficulties by the staircase procedure. 177 Thus, the RT of decision here much reflected the decision uncertainty level, rather than the task 178 difficulty, indicating that the participants should be aware of uncertainty during the choice, and 179 might be vacillating among the options during choices. In contrast, the RT for confidence report 180 was not correlated with the uncertainty level in both tasks (one tailed t test, t 21 = 1.1, P = 0.14 in 181 the Sudoku task; t 21 = 1.2, P = 0.12 in the RDM task). Further, the correlation coefficient 182 between RT of option choices and the uncertainty level (r RT-uncertainty ) in the initial decision was 183 highly correlated with the uncertainty sensitivity (A ROC ) across the participants ( Figure 5B ; r = 184 0.61, z test, z = 3.4, P = 4.0 × 10 -4 in the Sudoku task; r = 0.48, z = 2.4, P = 0.0085 in the RDM 185 task). Thus, the RT-uncertainty correlation also reflected individual uncertainty sensitivity. 186 187 The subjective beliefs of decision uncertainty were much reduced by redecision. The more 188 uncertain the first decision was, the more reduced the uncertainty level was ( Figure 1F ). The 189 extent of uncertainty reduction by redecision was highly correlated with the uncertainty level of 190 the initial decision (one tailed t test, Goodman and Kruskal's γ = 0.82 ± 0.11, t 21 = 8.8, P = 2.1 × 191 10 -8 in the Sudoku task; γ = 0.78 ± 0.14, t 21 = 7.7, P = 8.2 × 10 -8 in the RDM task). Accordingly, 192 the objective accuracy of decisions was also improved with uncertainty reduction ( Figure 1G ; r = 193 0.54 ± 0.13, t 21 = 4.2, P = 2.3 × 10 -4 in the Sudoku task; r = 0.39 ± 0.14, t 21 = 2.8, P = 5.6 × 10 -3 194 in the RDM task). One may suspect that the improvement of uncertainty reduction and accuracy 195 change would be caused by regression toward mean: the worse at the first measurement, the 196 greater of the improvement at the second measurement. However, their decision accuracy and 197 uncertainty levels in the final decision remained significantly differential across the different 198 uncertainty levels of the initial decision ( Figure 1C , r = 0.35 ± 0.15, t 21 = 2.1, P = 0.032 in the 199 Sudoku task; r = 0.36 ± 0.14, t 21 = 2.6, P = 8.9 × 10 -3 in the RDM task; Figure 1G , r = 0.32 ± 200 0.14, t 21 = 2.0, P = 0.042 in the Sudoku task; r = 0.32 ± 0.15, t 21 = 2.2, P = 0.028 in the RDM 201 task), indicating that the participants' performance in redecision reflected their (metacognition) 202 abilities, rather than by chances. Although both uncertainty levels and decision accuracy were 203 much improved by redecision, the divergence between the uncertainty sensitivity and the 204 decision accuracy remained significant in the final decision ( Figure 1H ; one tailed paired-t test, 205 t 21 = 3.4, P = 0.0013 in the Sudoku task; t 21 = 2.6, P = 0.0084 in the RDM task). Indeed, neither 206 the individual uncertainty sensitivities, nor those of individual differences, were altered by 207 redecision ( Figure 1I ; two tailed paired-t test, t 21 = 0.82, P = 0.21 in the Sudoku task; t 21 = 1.0, P 208 = 0.15 in the RDM task). Similarly, neither the individual RT-uncertainty correlation 209 coefficients, nor those of individual differences, were altered by redecision ( Figure 1E ; two 210 tailed paired-t test, t 21 = -0.77, P = 0.22 in the Sudoku task; t 21 = 0.35, P = 0.36 in the RDM 211 6 task). Altogether, the individual uncertainty sensitivity appeared stable and intrinsic to individual 212 metacognition ability, independent of the decision-making process or accumulated evidence.
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The metacognition network involved in metacognitive monitoring and controlling in 216 redecision 217 218 Commonly across the two tasks, the brain activations in the initial decision were mainly 219 restricted to the brain areas posterior to the PFC, and the posterior part of the PFC, in particular, 220 inferior frontal junction (IFJ) (Figure 2A , Figure S1A and S1C), while a frontoparietal control 221 network, consisting of dACC, lFPC, anterior insular cortex (AIC), middle dorsolateral PFC 222 (mDLPFC) and anterior inferior parietal lobule (aIPL), was newly or more extensively recruited 223 in redecision ( Figure 2B ; Figure S1B and S2; Table S1 ). However, when a new Sudoku problem 224 or a new RDM stimulus was presented during the redecision phase, preceded by the control 225 conditions in the decision phase, the regions of the anterior PFC (i.e., lFPC, mDLPFC, and 226 dACC) were not activated (fMRI2, n = 17; Figure S1A and Figure S3 ). This result supports that 227 the frontoparietal control network, in particular, the regions of lFPC, mDLPFC and dACC in the 228 anterior FPC, were predominately involved in the redecision process, but not involved in the 229 initial decision process. Thus, the redecision process evoked a separate neural system, separate 230 from the decision-making neural system.
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Activities in the regions of the frontoparietal control network in redecision were positively 233 correlated with the uncertainty level of the initial decision ( Figure 2C and Table S2 ). Critically, 234 these correlations remained significant even for the correct trials only ( Figure S1E ), indicating 235 these regions involved in uncertainty monitoring, rather than error monitoring. In contrast, 236 activities in the ventromedial PFC (VMPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) regions of the 237 default-mode network were negatively correlated with the uncertainty level ( Figure S1F ). 238 Although activations in the dACC and AIC regions during the decision phase were also detected 239 by the general linear modeling (GLM) analyses (Figure 2A and Figure S1A ), but activities in the 240 two regions were not correlated with the uncertainty level ( Figure S1D ). Furthermore, the 241 activations of the frontoparietal control network in redecision were not merely involved in 242 uncertainty monitoring. In the third fMRI experiment (fMRI3, n = 25), we confirmed that the 243 strength of activities in these regions depended critically on whether redecision on the previous 244 situation was required after the initial decision or not. When the uncertainty levels of the initial 245 decisions were matched in the two conditions (two tailed paired t test, t 25 = 0.62, P = 0.27), 246 activities were much stronger in the condition where redecision on the previous situation was 247 required, in comparison with those in the condition where redecision was not required ( Figure   248 2D), though the activities in the latter condition were also significant, and correlated with the 249 decision uncertainty level ( Figure S1G , Wan et al., 2016). Thus, the regions in the frontoparietal 250 control network, which were more strongly activated in redecision, should be also involved in 251 metacognitive controlling. We then putatively defined this frontoparietal control network as the 252 metacognition network. However, these two interactive processes could be dissociated in redecision. In the region that Figure 3B ), but negatively in the RDM task ( Figure 3B and Figure S1I ). These results suggest 281 that lFPC should be instead involved in decision adjustment to reduce decision uncertainty in 282 redecision, in particular, in the Sudoku task. In addition, the activities of the bilateral ventral IPL 283 regions and VMPFC were also positively correlated with the level of uncertainty reduction in 284 both tasks ( Figure S1I ). The VMPFC activities appeared intrinsically anti-correlated with 285 activities of dACC or the other regions of the metacognition network (the details about the 286 VMPFC activities will be discussed in another study). Thus, dACC and AIC appeared 287 specifically involved in metacognitive monitoring. Instead, lFPC appeared specifically involved 288 in metacognitive controlling. Their functional roles in metacognition were dissociated in 289 redecision.
Dissociation of metacognitive monitoring and controlling in the metacognition network in
291
The opposite regression of the lFPC activities with the extent of uncertainty reduction in the 292 Sudoku and RDM tasks might reflect its different roles in decision adjustment in the two tasks. 293 Decision adjustment in the perceptual decision-making tasks would merely require low-level 294 cognitive control, for instance, paying more attention on the new sensory information in 295 redecision, whereas that in the rule-based decision-making tasks (i.e., Sudoku solving) would 296 require high-level cognitive control, for instance, exploring alternative solutions. In the latter 297 case, metacognitive controlling needed more effort, and whether the problem would be better 298 solved should be conditioned to individual intrinsic motivation to engage the metacognitive 299 controlling process. The ventral striatum (VS) was positively correlated with the extent of 300 uncertainty reduction in the Sudoku task, but not in the RDM task ( Figure 3C ). To the end, VS 301 might encode intrinsic motivation to engage the metacognitive controlling in the Sudoku task. 302 Critically, the lFPC activity was significantly coupled with the interaction between the VS 303 activity and the uncertainty level ( Figure 3D ; see PPI analysis in Materials and Methods), and the 304 accuracy change of each participant by redecision was positively correlated with the coupling 305 strength in the Sudoku task ( Figure 3E ). These results imply that the efficiency of lFPC 306 involvement in metacognitive controlling in the rule-based decision-making tasks (Sudoku) 307 should be conditioned to intrinsic motivation, modulated by the VS activity. Figure 4C upper; one tailed t-test, r = 0.79, t 19 = 5.6, P = 6.0 × 10 -6 in the 327 Sudoku task; r = 0.55, t 19 = 2.9, P = 0.0049 in the RDM task; Table S3 ), but not with that in the 328 lFPC region ( Figure 4B and Figure 4C bottom; one tailed t-test, r = 0.27, t 19 = 1.2, P = 0.12 in 329 the Sudoku task; r = 0.31, t 19 = 1.4, P = 0.085 in the RDM task), commonly in both tasks. In 330 contrast, the individual accuracy change was significantly correlated with the mean activity in 331 the lFPC region ( Figure 4D and Figure 4E bottom; one tailed t-test, r = 0.69, t 19 = 4.2, P = 2.2 × 332 10 -4 in the Sudoku task; r = -0.39, t 19 = 1.9, P = 0.041 in the RDM task), but not with that in the 333 dACC region ( Figure 4D and Figure 4E upper; one tailed t-test, r = 0.28, t 19 = 1.3, P = 0.11 in 334 the Sudoku task; r = -0.02, t 19 = 0.09, P = 0.47 in the RDM task). When the lFPC activity was 335 stronger, the accuracy change was more in the Sudoku task, but became less in the RDM task 336 ( Figure 4E ). In addition, the individual accuracy change was also positively correlated with the 337 uncertainty-level regression β value of the lFPC activity in the Sudoku task ( Figure S4 , one tailed 338 t-test, r = 0.70, t 19 = 4.3, P = 0.00017), but not in the RDM task ( Figure S4 Figure 5C and 5D ). As the confidence reports per se are subjective, 351 the association with RT could be more objective to reflect the internal uncertain states. 352 Altogether, these neural correlates of individual differences in metacognitive abilities further 353 suggest that the functional roles of dACC and lFPC in metacognition should be dissociated. Figure S2 ). These activation differences might be partially caused by different subjective 361 uncertain states between the two conditions that were not reflected by the four-scale confidence 362 ratings (the ceiling effect). The averaged accuracy was about 80% in the certain trials of the tasks 363 ( Figure 1C ), but it was about 95% in the control conditions. However, these task baseline Figure 6G right; one tailed t-test, r = -0.40, t 19 = 1.9, P = 0.035), but not with that in the dACC 381 region ( Figure 6G left; one tailed t-test, r = -0.13, t 19 = 0.57, P = 0.29). Thus, the task baseline 382 activity in the dACC region could reflect the individual uncertainty monitoring bias in both 383 tasks, whereas that in the lFPC region could predict the individually differential potential 384 abilities of metacognitive controlling for decision adjustment in both tasks.
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Functional connectivity in the metacognition network 387 388 Thus far we have shown that the neural system of metacognition can be dissociated into at least 389 two subsystems: the dACC and AIC regions involved in metacognitive monitoring of decision 390 uncertainty, and the lFPC region involved in metacognitive controlling of decision adjustment. 391 To further elaborate the subsystems of the metacognition network, we made analyses of 392 interregional functional connectivity in the metacognition network. By regressing out the mean 393 activities, and the modulations by the uncertainty level, the RT and the level of uncertainty 394 reduction, as well as their interactions, we calculated trial-by-trial correlation between each pair 10 of regions in the metacognition network (see Materials and Methods). The interregional 396 functional connectivity patterns in both the task condition ( Figure 7A ) and the control condition 397 ( Figure 7B ) were almost identical between the two tasks, and also similar to that at the resting 398 state ( Figure 7C ). The interregional functional connectivity patterns consistently showed that the 399 metacognition network might be divided into three subsystems: the lFPC region; the dACC and 400 AIC regions; the DLPFC and aIPL regions. The interregional functional connectivity within each 401 of the subsystems was considerably stronger than that across the subsystems. So far, the 402 functional roles of the subsystem consisting of the DLPFC and aIPL regions in metacognition 403 remain unclear. It is worthy of noting that the functional connectivity between dACC and the 404 regions of the other two subsystems in the task conditions was slightly stronger than the 405 corresponding one at the resting state. In the present study, we utilized a novel "decision-redecision" paradigm to examine the 411 behavioral and neural correlates of metacognition in decision uncertainty monitoring and 412 decision adjustment controlling during the redecision phase, in comparison with those correlates 413 of the decision-making process during the initial decision phase. The behavioral results were 414 similar between the two tasks, and largely contradicted the predictions by the theory that There were some potential pitfalls for the fMRI data analyses in the current study. As the 533 metacognition process should automatically accompany the decision-making process with 534 uncertainty, it excludes the conventional techniques of fMRI paradigms to insert time jitters of 535 blank between the initial decision phase and the redecision phase. Thus, generally speaking, the 536 two events of the decision-making process and the metacognition process in the general linear 537 models (GLM) could be collinear, and result in inflations of standard errors of the estimated 538 parameters, in particular, for the regions to be involved in both processes. Fortunately, for the 539 regions of interest involved in metacognition, consistent with our predictions, their activations 540 predominately appeared in redecision. Actually, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was about 541 2.4, suggesting the collinearity of the GLM models was not severe. 542 543 In summary, decision-making is usually accompanied by uncertainty. The subsequent 544 decision uncertainty monitoring and decision adjustment tend to be automatically elicited by 545 uncertainty. Thus, decision-making might be usually accompanied by metacognition, and the two 546 14 processes are sequentially coupled together. However, the neural system of metacognition 547 remains largely unclear so far, and was often misattributed to the decision-making process. For 548 the first time, to the best of our knowledge, we here constructed the extent and generality of the 549 functional architecture of the metacognition neural system in the PFC, separate from the 550 decision-making neural system (Figure 8 ). The metacognition neural system is comprised of the 551 metacognitive monitoring system and the metacognitive controlling system. The metacognitive 552 monitoring system consisting of the dACC and AIC regions are domain-general. It reads out the 553 uncertainty information from the decision-making process and quantitatively encodes the 554 subjective uncertainty states. The metacognitive controlling system of the lFPC region 555 implements high-level cognitive control (e.g., strategy), dominantly in the rule-based and 556 abstract inference tasks (e.g., the Sudoku task), and might compete with low-level cognitive 557 control (e.g., attention), dominantly in the perceptual tasks (e.g., the RDM task). The high-level 558 cognitive control by the lFPC region is modulated by intrinsically motivational signals from the 559 VS region. These two subsystems sequentially monitor and control the decision-making system, 560 which is presumingly controlled by the IFJ region. The functions of the third subsystem of the 561 DLPFC and aIPL regions remain to be explored in the future. Thus, the decision-making neural 562 system and the metacognition neural system construct a closed-loop system to control and adapt 563 our behaviors toward the task goals. Finally, Further deepening our understanding of the 564 metacognition neural system will facilitate us to optimize the strategies for individual efficient Task sequences. The sequences of both Sudoku and RDM tasks were identical. In fMRI1, each 609 trial started with a green cross cue to indicate that the task stimulus would be presented 1 s later. 610 The stimulus was presented for 2 s, and then four options were presented and the participant 611 made a choice in 2 s. After an option was chosen, four confidence levels from 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest) were presented and the participant reported the confidence in 2 s. The same stimulus 613 was immediately presented again for 4 s, and then the participant selected a choice and reported 614 the confidence level again. Each trial lasted for 15 s. The control trials were intermingled with 615 the task trials. The sequence of the control trials was identical to that of the task trials. In each 616 task, there were 4 runs and each run consisted of 30 task trials and 10 control trials. The task 617 difficulty of each trial was adjusted by a staircase procedure through which one level was 618 upgraded after two consecutive correct trials and one level was downgraded after two 619 consecutive erroneous trials, and kept as the same otherwise, so that the mean accuracy was 620 converged to about 50%. Prior to each experiment, two runs were carried out for each participant 621 to practice and to stabilize performance. The Sudoku problems used in the learning and practice 622 sessions were different from those used in the fMRI and behavioral experiments. In addition, a 623 ten-minute resting fMRI experiment was conducted when the participant was in a resting state 624 with eyes opened. 625 The second fMRI experiment (fMRI2, Figure 3 and Figure S1C ) was carried out to examine 626 whether the metacognition network would be also essentially involved in the cognitive processes 627 of the initial decision, when a new Sudoku problem or RDM stimulus was presented for decision 628 at the first time during the redecision phase, following the control conditions in the decision 629 phase. In the decision phase, all situations were those as used in the control conditions of fMRI1. 630 In the redecision phase, the same control situations appeared in a half of trials and new Sudoku 631 problems (or RDM) stimuli appeared in the other half of trials. These two cases appeared 632 randomly in the redecision phase. The new Sudoku problems (or RDM) stimuli used in the 633 experiment were selected from those in which each individual participant would mostly make 634 confirmative choices, that is, the confidence ratings were predominately 4. The task sequence 635 was same as used in fMRI1. In total, there were 120 trials across two runs. 636 The third fMRI experiment (fMRI3, Figure 2D and Figure S1E ) was carried out to compare 637 brain activities in the redecision condition (required to make a decision on the foregone situation 638 again) with those in the non-redecision condition (not required to make a decision on the 639 foregone situation again) following the initial decisions in both Sudoku and RDM tasks. The task 640 sequence was very similar as used in fMRI1, but the presentation time of the stimulus was 3 s 641 during the redecision phase. The stimuli used in the non-redecision condition during the second 642 phase were those used in the control condition in each task. In each task, both the redecision and 643 non-redecision conditions were randomly intermingled, and each consisted of 60 trials across 3 644 runs. 645 In the fMRI experiments, the participants viewed images of the stimuli on a rear-projection 646 screen through a mirror (resolution, 1024 × 768 pixels; refresh rate, 60 Hz). Normal or corrected-647 to-normal vision was achieved for each participant. All images were restricted to 3 degrees 648 surrounding the fixation cross. Behavioral experiments. To test the reliability of the participants' metacognitive abilities, 659 behavioral experiments were carried out using same paradigms of the Sudoku and RDM tasks. Figure S1I ), or reversing the orthogonalization order ( Figure S1J) . 696 For group level analysis, we used FMRIB's local analysis of mixed effects (FLAME), The scheme of functional architecture of the metacognition neural system and its interactions 992 with the decision-making neural system, synthesized from the converging results in the current 993 study. The metacognition neural system is comprised of the metacognitive monitoring system 994 (dACC and AIC) and the metacognitive controlling system (lFPC). The decision-making neural 995 system and the metacognition system construct a closed-loop system to control and adapt our 996 behaviors toward the task goals. 
